Abstract: Optical techniques for information security have drawn a lot of attention in recent years. The development of cryptanalysis strategies will also have a positive promotion for the cryptosystems themselves. However, most of the present publications on cryptanalysis of optical cryptosystems are focusing only on theoretical analysis but not on experimental verification. In this paper, a practical optical cryptanalysis method using wavefront shaping is proposed. Considering that the confusion and diffusion of information in the optical cryptosystem are actually caused by scattering effect of random phase mask(s), the proposed method employs a point source function and the feedback-based optimization algorithm, which can obtain an equivalent key of the optical cryptosystem. In such a way, the confusion and diffusion of the random phase mask(s) in the cryptosystem could be removed successfully. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time the attack strategy from the perspective of wavefront shaping can be seen, and one of the biggest advantages is that it could get an equivalent key of the cryptosystem without deducing its original keys.
Introduction
Optical encryption technique is a burgeoning area in the field of information security due to the fact that optical techniques have inherent advantages such as the abilities of parallel signal processing and high dimensional operating [1] - [4] . The classical double random phase encoding (DRPE) scheme, first proposed by Refregier and Javidi in 1995, is one of the most promising optical encryption techniques [5] . Over the past two decades, the DRPE scheme has been expanded from Fourier transform (FT) domain [5] , [6] into some other transformation domains such as fractional Fourier transform (FrFT) domain [7] - [10] and Fresnel transform (FrT) domain [11] - [14] . Note that the aforementioned FT, FrFT, and FrT are all special cases of linear canonical transform (LCT). In these optical cryptosystems in LCT domain, one or more statistically independent random phase mask(s) (RPMs) are usually served as the security key(s) to scramble the original plaintext into a noise-like ciphertext. So, they could be collectively called universal optical cryptosystems based on random phase encoding (RPE) in LCT domain.
On the other hand, the security issue of universal RPE-based cryptosystems in LCT domain has been wildly studied [15] - [28] , and there are various attack methods on this kind of cryptosystems such as chosen-ciphertext attacks [15] , chosen-plaintext attacks [16] - [18] , known-plaintext attack [20] - [24] , and ciphertext-only attack [25] , [26] . Actually, the majority of attack methods on one of the RPE-based cryptosystems in LCT domain usually cannot directly act on another RPE-based cryptosystem in LCT domain due to the influence of system parameters. Recently, there are two attack methods based on correlated imaging [27] and ptychographical imaging [28] claimed they can act on the universal RPE-based cryptosystems in LCT domain. However, both of them need to encrypt a large amount of known plaintexts and record their corresponding complex valued ciphertexts. Furthermore, most of the present published works on cryptanalysis of optical cryptosystems are focusing on only theoretical analysis but no experimental verifications.
In a different context, wavefront shaping is an intriguing computational imaging technique [29] . It is a common sense that laser beam will be diffused and transformed into a speckle field when propagating through scattering media, such as milk or biological tissue. Realization of diffused light into a focal spot by modulating the wavefront of the incident beams is of great significance. Since Vellekoop and Mosk first reported a wavefront shaping strategy to focus light through scattering media in 2007 [30] , [31] . The ability to focus light at any desired position has shown a huge potential for practical applications [32] - [38] . The field of wavefront shaping is under rapid development, and proof-of-concept applications in deep tissue microscopy [32] , endoscopy [33] , super-resolution imaging [34] , nano-positioning [35] , and cryptography [36] , [37] have been demonstrated. In 2012, Katz et al. showed that wavefront shaping technique enabled wide-field imaging through turbid layers according to the optical memory effect [38] .
In this manuscript, we proposed an alternative optical cryptanalysis method on the universal RPE-based cryptosystems in LCT domain by using the principle of wavefront shaping technique. By introducing a phase-only spatial light modulator (SLM) and a continuous sequential (CS) feedback algorithm, we can iteratively modulate the phase distribution of wavefront behind the output plane of cryptosystem and then get a focused point on the final detector plane. Holding this knowledge of phase distribution on the SLM, an attacker could be able to directly reconstruct the original plaintext image from its corresponding ciphertext. Note that this phase distribution on SLM can be regarded as an approximate compensation for the confusion and diffusion effects introduced by the encryption keys (RPMs) it also can be preserved as an "equivalent key." Compared with the existing attack method [27] , [28] , our approach just needs to put a simple point source function on the input plane of the cryptosystem. And compared with the traditional impulse attack method, the advantage of our method is not need to record the complex-valued output with holographic setup, which can decrease the systematic error induced by additional holographic setup.
Principle
In this section, we first review the universal optical cryptosystems based on RPE in LCT domain. After giving a brief introduction on the principle of wavefront shaping [30] , we describe the proposed optical cryptanalysis method using wavefront shaping.
Overview of Optical Cryptosystem
Firstly, we briefly review the encryption and decryption procedures of the universal cryptosystems based on RPE in LCT domain. Here we provide a common model that can describe any kind of optical cryptosystems based on the RPE in LCT domain. For simplicity, the coordinates of the involved parameters in the following description are omitted. As shown in Fig. 1 , let M 1 , M 2 , . . . , M i represent i RPMs, respectively, which are statistically independent and serve as the secret keys of the cryptosystems. LCT denotes an arbitrary linear canonical transform, such as FT, FrT and FrFT. The plaintext is placed on the input plane of a cryptosystem. The ciphertext is a complex-valued distribution on the output plane when the whole system is illustrated by a collimated coherent plane wave while it is an intensity pattern when an incoherent illumination is used. The encryption process can be mathematically expressed as
where P and C, respectively, represent plaintext and ciphertext of cryptosystem, LCT{ · } denotes linear canonical transform operation, and the symbol "×" represents matrix dot product operation. The decryption procedure of this cryptosystem is the exact reverse process of encryption, which can be written by
where LCT −1 {·} denotes the corresponding reverse linear canonical transform operation and M i represents the conjugate of M i .
Specifically, when LCT is FT and i = 2, (1) and (2) are the exact encryption and decryption processes of classical DRPE scheme; when LCT is FrFT and i = 2, (1) and (2) are the exact encryption and decryption processes of the DRPE scheme in the FrFT domain; when LCT is FrT and i = 2, (1) and (2) are the exact encryption and decryption processes of the DRPE scheme in the FrT domain.
The Principle of Wavefront shaping
As we all known, when a scattering media is illuminated with a plane wave, the transmitted light will be diffused and form a random speckle field at the detector plane [see Fig. 2(a) ]. However, when the same scattering media is illuminated with a specially shaped wave, the transmitted light could be focused on a single spot at the detector plane [see Fig. 2(b) ].
Technically, as shown in Fig. 2(b) , this specially shaped wave could be obtained by introducing a phase-only spatial light modulator (SLM) that consists of 2D-array pixels. These tiny pixels are first grouped into many square segments with equal size. Note that the wave field at the detector plane is usually regarded as a result of all light waves coming from different aforementioned segments interfering with each other. The position where the scattered light is expected to focus on is called target position. Obviously, the intensity value of target position will simultaneously change with the phase values of one or more segments. Based on this common sense, the wavefront shaping process goes as follows: keep modulating the phase values of segments until the intensity value of the target position reaches its maximum. In this process, an intensity detector is employed to monitor the intensity changing of the target position, and an optimization algorithm is designed to simultaneously modulate the segments' phase values on the SLM according to the feedback provided by an intensity detector (such as CCD camera). This way, a wavefront shaped by the SLM can form a focused point at the target position.
Attack Approach
Inspired by the idea of aforementioned feedback-based wavefront shaping technique, we proposed an alternative optical cryptanalysis approach on the cryptosystems based on RPE, which is presumed to be available in all the LCT domains. The proposed attack can be regarded as a special case of chosen-plaintext attack. A point source function as a specially chosen plaintext is placed at the input plane of a cryptosystem and the corresponding complex-valued point spread function (PSF) is formed on the output plane of cryptosystem. It is obvious that, the PSF is a random distribution due to the confusion and diffusion of RPMs. However, if this random PSF coming from a point source can be inverted into a focused point again by an extra optical element or device, any ciphertext generated in the original cryptosystem can then be inverted into its corresponding plaintext due to the optical memory effect [38] . Therefore, how to invert the random PSF into a focused point is our main concern. We have identified that this particular issue happens to be a problem of focusing light through scattering media. From this point of view, we try to remove the effects of confusion and diffusion caused by RPMs with use of wavefront shaping technique to crack the cryptosystem.
In our attack approach, as shown in Fig. 3 , the whole cryptosystem to be attacked can be regarded as a black box and it is placed at the input plane of a 4f architecture. Meanwhile, a phaseonly SLM and a CCD camera are respectively placed at the frequency plane and output plane of the 4f architecture wherein the CCD camera provides feedback for an optimization algorithms that programs the SLM. Normally, there are several feedback-based optimization algorithms for wavefront shaping technique and the feedback-based CS optimization algorithm [31] is employed as the optimization algorithms in our approach because of its two advantages: 1) The algorithm runs continuously and dynamically follows changes in the RPMs' scattering behavior; (2) the target signal starts to increase directly, which increases the signal-to-noise ratio of successive measurements.
Concretely, the 2D-array pixels in the SLM is first divided into N equally sized square segments, and all the pixels in the same segments will be set to the same values all the times. For each segment, the possible phase values are equally divided into K pieces in range [0,2π]. Before performing the feedback-based CS optimization algorithm, we set the phase values of all segments to be 0. As shown in Fig. 4 , the detailed steps of feedback-based CS optimization algorithm are as follows: firstly, load all possible phase values in turn on the first segment from 0 to 2π on the SLM, and simultaneously record and observe the intensity of target position. The optimal phase value for the first segment will be determined when we have observed the highest intensity value of the target position in the detector plane. In this way, we continue to modulate the phase of the other segments one by one as shown in Fig. 4 . It is worth noting that, when modulating the phase of underlying segment, the phase of all the previous modulated segments are not set as 0 but keep as their optimal phase values. The intensity value of target position can be monitored in real time by calculating the intensity growth factor η, which is defined as
where I n and I 0 denote the current intensity value at target position after the n th measurement and the statistical average of intensity before optimization, respectively. After completing the modulation for the last segment, we obtain the final phase distribution (Q) on the SLM and now the intensity value of target position is presumed at its global maximum. The focused point on the detector plane can be regarded as the corrected image of the point source function of the optical cryptosystem and the cascaded 4f architecture behinds it. And then the object which is located in the vicinity of the pre-corrected point source could be directly imaged on the detector plane as result of the optical memory effect [38] . Therefore, with the help of this phase distribution (Q) obtained by wavefront shaping technique, an unknown plaintext can be directly retrieved with high fidelity from its corresponding ciphertext, which can be mathematically expressed as
where P denotes the retrieved plaintext by proposed attack approach. In this sense, the final phase distribution (Q) on the SLM can be preserved as an "equivalent key" of cryptosystem. One prominent advantage is that there is no need to capture any complex amplitude field as any other previous approach did.
Results and Discussion

Numerical Simulations
A series of numerical simulations have been carried out to demonstrate the validity of the proposed attack approach. The all numerical simulations are performed in the MATLAB R2013a environment. Without loss of generality, the attack test is performed on the classical DRPE scheme in the FT domain and it could be easily applied into the DRPE-based optical cryptosystem in any LCT domain. In the following numerical simulations, the wavelength of illumination light is set as λ = 532 nm, and the size of all the images are set as 100 × 100 pixels with 0.2 mm pixel size. The two RPMs are generated by computer and randomly distributed in [0, 2π] with 256 gray-levels. A point function, δ(0, 0), as the specially chosen plaintext, is shown in Fig. 5(a) . By performing the encryption procedure of classical DRPE scheme in the FT domain, the corresponding PSF is shown in Fig. 5(b) . To implement the attack process, we should first introduce the wavefront shaping technique to acquire the "equivalent key." As aforementioned description, the feedback-based CS optimization algorithm is employed as the optimization algorithms to modulate the SLM one segment by one segment. In our numerical simulations, the size of each segment is set to be the size of one pixel, so the total number of segments will be exactly same as the total number of pixels (i.e. N = 100 × 100). This is obviously the most time-consuming way but with highest precision. The search step size in phase range [0, 2π] for each segment is 0.2π (i.e., the number of searches for each segment is set as K = 10).
To monitor the changes of the intensity of target position, we calculate the intensity growth factor η after each measurement, and the relation between the intensity growth factor and the number of optimized segments is shown in Fig. 5(c) , which indicates that the intensity growth factor η increases gradually along with the number of optimized segments. After completing all measurements of feedback-based CS optimization algorithm, we can obtain the final phase distribution of SLM as shown in Fig. 5(d) .
Meanwhile, the intensity distribution on the detector plane before and after performing the feedback-based CS optimization algorithm are shown in Fig. 6(a) and (b) , respectively. For clarity, we have also provided the corresponding profiles along the center transverse line, which are shown in Fig. 6(c) and (d) , respectively. Obviously, before optimization, the intensity distribution on the detector plane is a speckle pattern, while it focused on the target position after optimization.
With this obtained phase distribution [see Fig. 5(d) ], we try to recover some unknown plaintexts from their corresponding ciphertexts. Fig. 7(a) and (b) show a binary image with the letters "SZU" and its corresponding ciphertext, respectively. Fig. 7(c) shows the attack result by our approach. Furthermore, our attack test is also performed to the case of grayscale image. Fig. 7(d) shows a standard grayscale image "Lena" with 256 gray-levels and Fig. 7(e) shows its corresponding ciphertext. The attack result by our proposed strategy is shown in Fig. 7(f) . It is clear that the plaintext images have been recovered with high fidelity.
To further evaluate the quality of the recovered image, the correlation coefficient (CC) between the recovered image P and the original plaintext image P is used as an objective criterion. The CC is defined as follows: ), (c) the recovered result from (b) by our attack approach, (d) a grayscale image "Lena," (e) the corresponding ciphertext of (e), and (f) the recovered result from (e) by our attack approach.
where P and P denote the mean value of images P and P , P mn , and P mn are the pixel values at the coordinate (m, n) of images P and P . Obviously, the CC value ranges from 0 to 1, and the higher CC value implies the more similar between two images. The CC values between the original binary image "SZU" and the recovered one is 0.9655, and that of the grayscale image "Lena" is 0.9027. This again verifies the effectiveness of our strategy. In the above simulations, the number of segments is set as same as the number of total pixels, which is a perfect case, and it has an advantage of getting the more exact phase distribution so that recovering more accurate plaintexts. However, more numbers of segments means that more time will be consumed for the attack process. Next, we would like also to test the influence on the attack results to different numbers of segments. Fig. 8(a) and (b) show the obtained phase distribution of SLM when N is reduced to 1/4 (N 1 = 50 × 50) and 1/16 (N 2 = 25 × 25) of its original number (N = 100 × 100). Fig. 8(c) and (d) show the recovered image from the corresponding ciphertext [see Fig. 7(b) ] by using Fig. 8(a) and (b) , respectively. The corresponding CC values between the original binary image "SZU" and Fig. 8(c) is 0.7827 and that of Fig. 8(d) is 0.4751. From the image shown in Fig. 8(c) , we can see the letters "SZU" is still recognized when the number of segments is reduced to its original number's 1/4, but it gets totally unrecognizable when it reduces to 1/16.
In addition, we also test the influence of the search numbers per segment (K) on the attack results. The variation of CC values in accordance with the different K values is depicted in Fig. 9 . Obviously, the CC value gradually increasing with the higher K values, and it is closed to 1 when the K value larger than 6. It is worth pointing out that the CC value between the original plaintext image and retrieved image is 0.9039 when the search numbers per segment is set as K = 5. These results indicate the efficiency of our proposed attack approach could be greatly improved by decreasing the search numbers per segment.
To further validate our attack approach, we provide some other numerical simulations on attacking the DRPE-based cryptosystem in the FrT domain that is another RPE-based cryptosystems in LCT domain. In this group of simulations, the two Fresnel diffraction distances are set as d 1 = d 2 = 100 mm and other parameters and RPMs are the same as aforementioned numerical simulations. Fig. 10(a) shows a same binary image with the letters "SZU", which is chosen plaintext to be encrypted. Fig. 10(b) shows its corresponding ciphertext by using the encryption procedure of the DRPE-based cryptosystem in the FrT domain. Fig. 10(c) shows the obtained phase distribution of the SLM after performing the wavefront shaping. Fig. 10(d) shows the retrieved image by the proposed attack approach. This result indicates that our attack scheme is also available for the DRPE-based cryptosystem in the FrT domain.
Optical Experiments
As an experimental verification of the proposed attack approach, optical demonstration is also conducted. The schematic and practicality pictures of our experimental setup are shown in Fig. 11(a) and (b) , respectively. A solid-state laser (λ = 532 nm) was introduced as the illumination source. A spatial filter and a collimating lens were placed behind the laser to ensure the beam is collimated. Meanwhile, an amplitude-only SLM1 (Holoeye, LC2002), which can be used to load any plaintext image, was placed at the input plane of a 4f configuration (f = 150 mm). A 220 grit-ground-glass diffuser (Thorlabs, DG10-220-MD), as the RPM, was placed behind the SLM 1 with d = 145 mm. A phase-only SLM 2 (Holoeye, PLUTO NIR-11) was placed at the frequency plane of the 4f configuration to modulate the scattered wavefront by using the aforementioned wavefront shaping strategy. A CCD camera (IMAGINGSOURCE, DMK-41BU02) was placed at the output plane of the 4f configuration to capture the corresponding speckle pattern and give feedback to SLM 2 according to the optimization algorithm. In addition, a rotatable polarizer and a rotatable analyzer were respectively placed in front of SLM 1 and CCD camera to reduce the influence of the background noise. When a flat phase pattern is displayed on the SLM 2 , this experimental setup can be regarded as a simplified RPE-based cryptosystem in LCT domain.
Firstly, a pinhole with 50 μm in diameter [see Fig. 12(a) ] chosen as the special plaintext was loaded on the SLM1. Before performing the wavefront shaping operation, when a flat phase pattern is displayed on the SLM2, a typical speckle pattern [see Fig. 12(b) ] will emerged on the CCD plane. Turn to the wavefront shaping process of our experiments, the SLM2 (1440 × 900 physical pixels) was divided into 1440 (48 × 30) equally sized square segments (i.e. 30 × 30 physical pixels were combined as an effective segments), and the phase values of every pixel in one segment are equal and belongs to the range [0, 2π] with a step of 0.2π. According to the aforementioned feedback-based CS optimization algorithm, the phases of all the segments in SLM2 were optimized to maximize the intensity of a selected subset on the CCD plane. As mentioned, the total number of iterations is proportional to the number of segments (N) and the searches per segment (K). That is to say, the more number of segments and the searches per segment, the more satisfactory quality of retrieved image as well as the more time is needed to finish the whole wavefront shaping process. But unfortunately, it is often impractical to spend too much time in most practical cryptanalysis. For the balance of the quality of decrypted image and the time-consuming, the principle of setting parameters is, under the premise of decrypted image can be recognized, the time-consuming should be as few as possible. In our experiment, the panel of SLM 2 was divided into N = 1440 (48 × 30) equally sized square segments, the searches per segment (K) was set to K = 10, and the frame rate of CCD camera was set to 60 Hz (i.e. the exposure time was 1/60 seconds). Thus, the whole wavefront shaping process took about 4 minutes to complete. After finishing the whole wavefront shaping process, the image of the point source is shown in Fig. 12(c) , and the optimized phase pattern of SLM 2 is shown in the inset of Fig. 12(c) . Then, the point source was replaced by another plaintext, a character "5" with 1 mm height, as shown in Fig. 12(d) . When a flat phase pattern is displayed on the SLM 2 , the image recorded by the CCD camera is a speckle pattern [see Fig. 12(e) ], which could be regarded as the ciphertext of character "5," but if the obtained optimized phase pattern was loaded on the SLM 2 , the image recorded by the CCD camera is shown in Fig. 13(f) . We also calculated the CC value between the decrypted image obtained in optical experiment [see Fig. 13(f) ] and the original plaintext image [see Fig. 12(d) ], which is 0.5014. Although there are some noises, we can recognize the character "5". These experimental results, to some extent, demonstrate the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed attack approach.
Furthermore, to confirm the influence of the search number on the proposed attack method, in our experiment, we performed five tests by setting the different searches (K) per segment (i. e. K = 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10, respectively). The decrypted images in accordance with the different searches (K) per segment are shown in Fig. 13(a) -(e), and Table 1 is the corresponding CC values. It is obvious that the retrieved images are more and more satisfactory with the greater searches (K) per segment.
It is noted that, two 220-grit-ground-glass diffuser were used and placed respectively in spatial domain and frequency domain of the 4f configuration in initial experimental setup. However, there is the poor experimental result and the character "5" in plaintext image could not recognize. The main cause is the particle size of this ground glass is relatively larger than the pixel size of an ideal random phase mask, which leads to the stronger wavefront information's diffusion. When two ground glasses were used, the range of the diffused speckle pattern is much larger than the panel range of CCD camera. Furthermore, as the limits of practical optical elements, there is no enough information of plaintext image could be recorded by CCD camera, which lead to the very poor quality of decrypted image in experimental demonstration despite simplicity of used plaintext image. Therefore, only one mask was used in optical experiments.
Conclusion
In summary, we have proposed an optical cryptanalysis method against the universal RPE-based cryptosystems in any LCT domain by using feedback-based wavefront shaping technique. Owing to the inherent merits of feedback-based wavefront shaping technique, the confusion and diffusion functions of the random phase keys could be approximately removed. Then one can directly recover any unknown plaintexts from their corresponding ciphertexts with the obtained phase distribution of SLM which is placed behind the cryptosystem. Compared with the traditional point spread function attack method, the advantage of our method is not need to record the complex-valued output, which can decrease the systematic error induced by additional holographic setup. Besides, the proposed attack method do not need to analysis every steps of encryption process and just treat the optical cryptosystem as a black box. Furthermore, our method could get an equivalent key of the cryptosystem without to deduce its original keys. The numerical simulations and experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed attack method.
